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A large  and growing  number  of countries  around the globe are re-examining  the roles of
various levels of government  and their partnerships  with the private sector and the civil society
with a view to creating governments  that work and serve their people (see Shah, 1997 for
motivations  for a change).  This rethinking  has led to a resurgence  of interest in fiscal federalism
principles and practices  but at the same  time invited  much  controversy  and debate.  In this debate,
perceived potential of a federal system for macroeconomic  mismamagement  and instability  has
invited most  intense interest. A  common conclusion arising from this  debate is  that  a
decentralized governance structure is incompatible  with prudent fiscal management (see e.g.
Prud'homme 1995, Tanzi, 1996).  This paper reflects upon the debate on the "dangers of
decentralization"  for macroeconomic  governance by providing a synthesis of theoretical and
empirical literature  as well as presenting  new evidence  on this sub  ject. The paper concludes  that,
contrary to a common misconception, decentralized fiscal  systems offer a greater potential for
improved macroeconomic governance than centralized fiscal  systems. This is to be expected as
decentralized  fiscal systems require greater clarity in the roles of various players (centers of
decision  making) and transparency  in rules that govern  their interactions  to ensure a fair play.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2  discusses the institutional
environment for macroeconomic  management.  This is elabotated separately for monetary
policy, fiscal policy and subnational borrowing.  Section 3 is concerned with macroeconomic
dimensions of securing an economic union.  In this context, issues pertaining to regulatory
environment,  tax coordination,  transfer  payments  and social insurance, intergovernmental  fiscal
transfers and regional equity are discussed. Section 4  outlines emerging challenges from
globalization.  Section 5 draws  some general  and institutional  lessons  for enhancing  the quality  of
macroeconomic  governance.
2. Institutional  Environment  For  Macroeconomic  Management
Using Musgrave's trilogy of  public functions namely allocation, redistribution and
stabilization, the fiscal federalism literature has traditionally  reached a broad consensus  that
while the former  function can be assigned  to lower  levels of government,  the latter  two functions
1are  more  appropriate for  assignment to  the  national government. Thus  macroeconomic
management - especially  stabilization policy -- was seen as clearly a central function (see e.g.
Musgrave, 1983: 516; Oates, 1972).  The stabilization  function  was considered  inappropriate  for
subnational  assignment  as (a) Raising  debt at the local level would entail higher regional costs
but benefits for such stabilization  would spill beyond regional borders and as a result too little
stabilization  would be provided;  (b) Monetization  of local debt will create inflationary  pressures
and pose a threat for price stability;  (c) Currency  stability  requires  that both monetary and fiscal
policy functions  be carried out by the center alone;  and (d) cyclical shocks  are usually  national  in
scope (symmetric  across all regions)  and therefore  require  a national  response. The above views
have been challenged  by several  writers (see e.g. Scott, 1964; Dafflon, 1977; Sheikh and Winer,
1977; Gramlich, 1987: Walsh, 1992; Biehl, 1994; Shah, 1994; Mihaljek, 1995; Sewell, 1995;
Huther and Shah, 1996) on theoretical and empirical grounds yet they continue to command
considerable  following.  An implication  that is often drawn is that decentralization  of the public
sector especially in  developing countries poses significant risks for  the "aggravation of
macroeconomic  problems"  (Tanzi, 1996,  p.305).
To form a perspective  on this issue, we reflect in the following  on the theoretical  and
empirical underpinnings  of the institutional  framework  required  for monetary  and fiscal policies.
2.i  Institutional SettingforMonetary Policy
Monetary  policy is concerned  with control  over the level and rate of change of nominal
variables such as the price level, monetary aggregates, exchange rate and nominal GDP. The
control over these nominal variables to provide for a stable macro environment  is commonly
agreed  to be a central function  and monetary  policy is centralized  in all nation states,  federal and
unitary alike. Nevertheless,  there are occasional  arguments  to add a regional dimension to the
design and implementation  of monetary policies. For example Mundell (1968) argues that an
optimal currency  area may be smaller than the nation state in some federations such as Canada
and USA and in such circumstances,  the differential  impact of exchange rate policies may be
inconsistent with  the  constitutional requirement of  fair  treatment  of  regions.  Further
complications arise when the federal government raises debt domestically, but  provincial
governments  borrow from abroad: This is the case in Canada as federal exchange rate policies
2affects provincial  debt servicing.  Similarly  Buchanan  (1997)  argues against the establishment  of
a confederal  central bank such as the European  Union Central Bank as it negates the spirit of
competitive  federalism.
In a centralized  monetary policy environment,  Barro (1996) has cautioned  that a stable
macro environment  may not be achievable  without  a strong commitment  to price stability  by the
monetary authority.  This is because if people anticipate  growth in money supply  to counteract  a
recession, the  lack  of  such response will  deepen recession. The credibility of  a  strong
commitment  to price stability  can be established  by consistently  adhering  to formnal  rules such as
a fixed exchange rate or to monetary rules.  Argentina's 1991 Convertibility  Law establishing
parity in the value of the peso in terms of the US dollar and Brazil's 1994 Real Plan helped
achieve  a measure of this level of credibility.  Argentine's central  bank strengthened  credibility  of
this commitment by enduring a  severe contraction in the monetary base during the period
December 1994 to March 1995 as speculative reactions to the Mexican crisis resulted in a
decline in its foreign exchange  reserves. Alternately,  guaranteeing  independence  from all levels
of the government,  for a central bank whose principal  mission iss  price stability could establish
the credibility of such a commitment  (Barro, 1996, Shah, 1994,  p.1 1). Barro considers  the focus
on price stability so vital that he regards an ideal central banker  as one who is not necessarily a
good macro economist  but one whose  commitment  to price stability  is unshakable.  He said, "The
ideal central  banker should always appear somber in public, never tell any jokes, and complain
continually about the dangers of inflation"  (1996, p.58).  Empirical studies show that that the
three most independent  central banks (the National Bank of Switzerland  - the Swiss Central
Bank, Bundesbank  of Germany, and the US Federal Reserve Board) over the period 1955 to
1988, had average inflation rates of 4.4 percent compared to  7.8 percent for the three least
independent  banks (New Zealand  until 1989, Spain and Italy). The inflation  rate in the former
countries  further showed  lower volatility. The same studies also show that the degree of central
bank independence  is unrelated  to the average  rate of growth  and average  rate of unemployment.
Thus Barro argues that a "more independent  central bank appears  to be all gain and no pain"
(1996, p.57). The European  Union has recognized  this principle  by establishing  an independent
European  Central Bank. The critical question  then is whether  or not independence  of the central
bank is compromised  under a decentralized  fiscal system. One would expect, a priori, that the
central bank would have greater stakes and independence  under a decentralized  system since
3such a system would require clarification  of the rules under which a central bank operates, its
functions and its relationships with various governments. For example,  when Brazil in 1988
introduced  a decentralized  federal constitution,  it significantly  enhanced  the independence  of the
central bank (Shah, 1991, Bomfim  and Shah, 1994).  Yet,  independence  of  the central bank in
Brazil remains  relatively weak compared  to other federal countries  (see Huther and Shah, 1996).
On the other hand, in centralized  countries  the role of the central bank is typically shaped and
influenced  by the Ministry of Finance. In an extreme  case, the functions  of the central bank of
the UK (a unitary state), the Bank of England,  are not defined  by law but have developed over
time by a tradition  fostered  by the UK Treasury.  Only in May 1997,  has the newly elected labor
party government  of Prime Minister  Tony Blair assured  the Bank of England a free hand in its
pursuit of price stability. Such independence  may still on occasions be compromised as the
Chancellor of the Exchequer still retains a  presence on the board of directors as a  voting
member. New Zealand and France (unitary states) have lately recognized the importance of
central bank independence  for price stability and have granted independence  to their central
banks.  The 1989  Reserve  Bank Act of New  Zealand  mandates  price stability  as the only function
of the central bank and expressly prohibits the government from involvement in monetary
policy. The People's Bank of China, on the other hand, does not enjoy such independence  and
often works as a development  bank or as an agency  for central  government  "policy lending"  and
in the process undermines  its role of ensuring  price stability (see World Bank, 1995 and Ma,
1995).
For a  systematic examination of this question, Huther and Shah (1996) relate the
evidence  presented in Cukierman,  Webb and Neyapti (1992) on central bank independence  for
80 countries  to indices of fiscal decentralization  for the same countries.  Cukierman  et al. assess
independence  of a central bank based upon an examination  of 16 statutory aspects of central
bank operations  including  the terms of office for the chief executive  officer,  the formal structure
of policy formulation,  the bank's objectives  as stated in its charter, and limitations  on lending to
the government. The correlation  coefficient in Table 1 shows a weak but positive association
confirming our  a  priori judgment that  central bank  independence is  strengthened under
decentralized  systems.
4Increases in the monetary  base caused  by the Central Bank's bailout of failing state and
non-state Banks represent occasionally an  important source of monetary instability and  a
significant  obstacle  to macro economic  management.  In Pakistan,  a centralized  federation,  both
the central and provincial  governments  have, in the past, raided,  nationalized  banks. In Brazil, a
decentralized  federation, state banks have made loans to their own governments  without due
regard for their profitability  and risks causing  the so called $1013  billion state debt crisis in 1995.
Thus a central bank role in ensuring arms length transactions between governments  and the
banking  sector would enhance monetary stability  regardless  of the degree of decentralization  of
the fiscal system.
Available empirical evidence suggests that such armns  length transactions are more
difficult to  achieve in  countries with  a  centralized structure of governance than under a
decentralized  structure with a  larger set of players. This is because a decentralized  structure
requires greater clarity in the roles of various public players, including  the central bank.  No
wonder  one finds that the four central banks most widely acknowledged  to be independent
(Swiss Central Bank, Bundesbank  of Germany,  Central Bank of Austria and the United States
Federal Reserve Board)  have all been the products of highly decentralized federal fiscal
structures.  It is interesting  to note  that the independence  of the Bundesbank  is not assured by the
German  Constitution.  The Bundesbank  Law providing  such independence  also stipulates  that the
central bank has an obligation  to support the economic  policy of the federal government. In
practice,  the Bundesbank  has primarily  sought  to establish  its independence  by focusing  on price
stability issues. This was demonstrated  most recently by its decision to raise interest rates to
finance German unification  in spite of the adverse  impacts on federal debt obligations  (see also
Biehl, 1994).
The Swiss Federal Constitution (article 39) assigns monetary policy to  the federal
government.  The federal government  has, however,  delegated  the conduct  of monetary policy to
the Swiss National Bank, a private limited company  regulated  by a special law. The National
Bank Act of 1953 has granted independence  in the conduct of monetary policy to the Swiss
National Bank although the bank is required  to conduct its policy in the general interest of the
country.  It is interesting  to note that the Swiss  National  Bank allocates  a portion of its profits to
5cantons to infuse a sense of regional ownership and participation  in the conduct of monetary
policy (see Gygi, 1991).
Monetary  Management  in Brazil: Unfinished  Agenda
Since 1988,  two major  changes  in the division  of powers  between  federal  and subnational
governments  have enhanced  the role of monetary  policy as a tool for macroeconomic  management
in Brazil. First, with the elimination  of the monetary  budget,  a very important  channel  for extra-
budgetary  transfers to subnational  governments  disappeared. Second,  the diminished  role of the
National Monetary Council,  which was perceived  as being more easily influenced  by regional
interests,  has contributed  to strengthening  the Central  Bank's control over the money supply. A
third monetary  policy  issue  that remains  firmly  in the hands of the federal  government  concerns  the
implementation  of incomes policies. Incomes  policies are defined as measures  aimed at direct
control of nominal  variables--such  as prices,  wages,  and nominally  denominated  assets--as  part of
an  effort to  lower the  inflation rate  and restore macroeconomic  equilibrium. The federal
government  is empowered  with the exclusive authority  to impose and enforce price and wage
controls throughout the nation with no formal consultation  being required with subnational
governments.  Such an authority  is frequently  used since there has been decentralization  of more
traditional  levers  of macroeconomic  management  such as taxes  and public  spending.
Despite  the exclusive  federal  jurisdiction  over the implementation  of incomes  policies and
the existence  of better federal  control  of monetary  aggregates,  the quasi-fiscal  nature of the Central
Bank  has  not  been  completely eliminated. An  important remaining issue  concerns the
intergovernmental  relations  that take place in the banking  system. The conspicuous  nature of the
Central Bank transfers received  by state banks is certainly  not desirable  from a fiscal federalism
perspective. Moreover,  increases  in the monetary  base caused  by the Central Bank's bail-outs  of
failing state banks represent  an important  source  of monetary  instability  and a significant  obstacle
to macroeconomic  management. The potential  contribution  of this debt  to the inflation  rate could
be large,  especially  given that the funds  provided  by the Central  Bank are turned into base money
and therefore have a multiplier effect on the aggregate  money supply. The recent bailout of
BANESPA,  a commercial  bank owned  by the State  of Sao Paulo, has gone further  to entrench  the
tradition and  expectation of  a  bailouts of  state owned banks. This tradition works against
6establishment  of fiscal  discipline  at the subnational  level  and also gives  wrong  signals  to the private
sector  when  the latter  have  to rate  the riskiness  of state  borrowing.
The chronically  weak situation  of many state banks in ]Brazil  is attributed  to their special
relations  with their respective  governments. State governments  exercise  substantial  influence  on
the portfolio allocation of their banks.  This is evidenced  by the fact that these banks make a
majority  of loans to their own governments  often  without  due regard  to profitability  of these loans.
In the short  run, a central  bank role in ensuring  arms-length  transactions  between  state  governments
and their banks would  be desirable.  In the long run, privatization  of government  controlled  banks
and independence  of the central bank from all levels of government  is essential for monetary
stability.  Thre has been substantial  progress  on both these issues.  For example,  under the Central
Bank Resolution#  2008, states are prohibited  from borrowing  from their own commercial  banks.
Also in 1997,  the Federal  Government  declined  to bailout  the state of Alagoas  from default on its
loan  repayment  obligations  to a private  bank  (see Dillinger,  1997).
Deconcentration of Monetary Management in China
China is a unitary country  and this unitary  character is strongly reinforced  through one
party  system.  However,  for pratical  purposes,  it mimimcs  a federation  in many  respects.  China  until
the early 1980s  had an unsophisticated  banking  system  comprised  of  the People's  Bank of China
(PBC),  along  with a few specialized  banks  such as the People's Construction  Bank - an arm of he
Ministry of Finance.  The central budget and the banking system provided  the working capital
needed  by enterprises  and cash used principally  to cover  labor costs and purchases  of agricultural
products. The role of the banking  system  was limited,  since most investments  in fixed assets in
enterprises  were financed  by direct transfers  or grants from the government  budget.  In 1983,  in a
major reform, direct grants were replaced with interest-bearing  loans to production  enterprises.
Consequently,  the  banking  system  gradually  became  the  primary  channel  through  which
investments were financed and the central authority exercised miacroeconomic  control.  In 1984, the
PBC was transformed into the Central Bank of China under the State Council and its commercial
banking operations were transferred to the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China.  A network of
provincial branches came to serve as the relays for the central bank's monetary operations.  At the
same time, other specialized banks and nonbank financial institutions and numerous local branches
7also emerged. The banks and the central bank established municipal, county and sometimes
township  level branches.  The  pressure  on the central  bank to lend  originated  in investment  demand
from state owned  enterprises  (SOEs).
These  developments  have  made possible  a decentralization  of enterprise  financing,  but they
have also created a wider financial arena for the scramble after resources and have greatly
complicated  the management  of monetary policy from the center.  Under the deconcentrated
system,  provincial  and local  authorities  have  substantial  powers  in investment  decision-making  and
exert great influence on local bank branches'  credit expansion. Although provinces  are given
certain  credit ceilings at the beginning  of the year, the central  bank is often forced to revise the
annual credit plans under pressure  from localities.  Local branches  of the central  bank was given
discretionary  authority  over 30 percent  of central  bank's annual  lending  to the financial  sector  (see
Word Bank, 1997:7.23).  Provincial  and local governments  used this discretionary  authority of
central  bank branches  to their advantage  by borrowing  at will thereby  endangering  price stability.
Two-digit  inflation  occurred  in 1988  and 1989  and was followed  by a credit squeeze. Monetary
(inflation) cycles appeared to  be more frequent than during the pre-reform era and caused
significant  resource  waste. As 1992's  credit ceilings  were again exceeded  by a surprisingly  high
margin,  for instance  two-digit  inflation  reoccurred  in 1993.
The 1994 reform  has addressed  a number  of important  drawbacks  in the previous system
that led to the central bank's weak control over 'the money supply.  In particular,  the proposed
establishment  of the new PBC branch  system,  the centralization  of personnel  management  for the
PBC  branches  and specialized  banks,  and the separation  of policy  lending  from commercial  lending
are all steps in the right direction (China has established  three policy banks to finance policy
lending  for investment  projects.). Central bank controls  over lending  to provincial  banks is also
reasserted.  The  People's Bank  also established  a Monetary  Board  to oversee  its operations  - astep  to
strengthen  its autonomy. However,  several  problems  that were responsible  for excessive  monetary
growth  in the past remain  unaddressed.  These  problems  are the following. (1) The central  bank is
still under the control of the State Council.  (2) Although the separation  of policy lending from
commercial  lending  is expected  to eliminate  the localities'  major instrument  in the monetary  game--
distorting  the investment  structure,  how the policy lending  projects  will be financed  in the future
remains  unsettled.  (3) A fundamental  source  of excessive  money  growth--structural  distortion--has
8not been given enough attention.  (4) The reform plan does not mention interest rate decontrol,
which will eliminate  the incentives  for the commercial  banks to divert funds from the banking
system  to black market  lending--an  important  cause  of the 1992-1993  monetary  expansion  (see Ma,
1995).  Leakages from the credit plan in 1993  and 1994,  however,  took place through interbank
market.
2.2 Institutional Setting for Fiscal Policy
In a unitary country,  the central government  assumes  exclusive responsibility  for fiscal
policy. In  federal countries, fiscal policy becomes a  responsibility shared by all  levels of
government  and the federal  government  in these countries  uses its powers  of the purse (transfers)
and moral suasion  through  joint meetings  to induce a coordinated  approach  to fiscal policy. The
allocation of responsibilities  under a federal system also pays some attention  to the conduct of
stabilization  policies. This is often done by assigning  stable and cyclically  less sensitive  revenue
sources and  expenditure responsibilities to  subnational governments. Such an  assignment
attempts to  insulate local governments from economic cycles and the national government
assumes prominence  in the conduct of a stabilization  policy.  In large federal countries such
insulation is usually possible only for the lowest tier of government as the intermediate tier
(states  and provinces)  shares  responsibilities  with the federal  government  in providing  cyclically
sensitive services such as social assistance.  These intermediate  tier governments  are allowed
access  to cyclically  sensitive  revenue  bases that act as built-in  (automatic)  stabilizers.
Several writers (Tanzi,  1996, Wonnacott, 1972) have argued, without empirical
corroboration,  that the financing  of subnational  governments  is likely to be a source of concern
within open federal systems  since subnational  governments  may circumvent  federal fiscal policy
objectives.  Tanzi (1995) is also concerned  with deficit creation  and debt management  policies of
junior governments.  Available  theoretical  and empirical  work does not provide support for the
validity  of these concerns. On the first point, at the theoretical  level, Sheikh and Winer (1977)
demonstrate that  relatively extreme and unrealistic assumptions about discretionary non-
cooperation by junior jurisdictions are needed to  conclude that stabilization by the central
authorities  would not work at all simply because of a lack of cooperation. These untenable
assumptions  include  regionally  symmetric  shocks,  a closed  economy,  segmented  capital markets,
9lack of supply  side-effects  of local fiscal policy,  non-availability  of built-in stabilizers  in the tax-
transfer  systems of subnational  governments  and in interregional  trade, constraints  on the use of
federal spending  power (such as conditional  grants intended  to influence  subnational  behavior),
unconstrained and undisciplined local borrowing and extremely non-cooperative collusive
behavior by subnational  governments  (see also Gramlich, 1987, Mundell, 1963, Spahn, 1997).
The empirical  simulations  of Sheikh and Winer  for Canada  further  suggest  that failure of federal
fiscal policy in most instances cannot be attributed to  non-cooperative  behavior by junior
governments.  Saknini, James and Sheikh (1996) further demonstrate  that, in a decentralized
federation  having markedly differentiated  subnational  economies  with incomplete  markets and
non-traded goods, federal fiscal policy acts as  insurance against region-specific risks and
therefore decentralized  fiscal structures  do not compromise any of the goals sought under a
centralized  fiscal policy (see also CEPR, 1993).
Gramlich  (1987)  points  out  that  in  open  economies, exposure to  international
competition would benefit some regions at the expense of others. The resulting asymmetric
shocks,  he argues, can be more effectively  dealt with by regional stabilization  policies in view of
the better information  and instruments  that are available  at the regional/local  levels. An example
supporting  Gramlich's view would  be the effect of oil price shocks on oil producing  regions. For
example,  the Province  of Alberta in Canada  dealt with such a shock effectively  by siphoning off
30 percent of oil revenues received during boom years to the Alberta Heritage Trust Fund, a
"rainy day umbrella" or a stabilization  fund. This fund was later used for stabilization  purposes
i.e. it was run down when the price of oil fell. The Colombia  Oil Revenue Stabilization  Fund
follows  the same  tradition.
The above conclusion  however,  must be qualified  by the fact that errant fiscal behavior
by powerful members of a federation can have an important constraining influence on the
conduct of federal macro policies. For example,  achievement  of the Bank of Canada's goal of
price stability  was made more  difficult  by the inflationary  pressures  arising  from the Province  of
Ontario's increases in social spending during the boom years of late 1980's. Such difficulties
stress  the need for fiscal policy  coordination  under a decentralized  federal system.
10On the potential for fiscal mismanagement  with decentralization  as noted above by
Tanzi,  empirical  evidence  from  a  number  of  countries  suggests  that,  while
nationalcentral/federal fiscal policies typically do not adhere to the European Union (EU)
guidelines  that deficits should not exceed 3% of GDP and debt should not exceed 60% of GDP,
junior governments  policies  typically  do. This is true both in decentralized  federal countries  such
as Argentina,  Brazil, Canada  and Germany  and centralized  federal countries such as Australia,
India and Pakistan. In Canada, over the period 1984  to  1994,  the Federal debt grew from 38
percent of GDP to 60 percent of GDP whereas  provincial  debt grew from 18 percent of GDP to
22 percent of GDP and the municipal  debt  grew from 3.6 percent  of GDP  to 3.8 percent of GDP.
In India, federal debt in 1996/97  is about 100 percent of GDP whereas state level debt is about
30 percent of GDP. Centralized  unitary  countries  do even  worse  on the basis of these indicators.
For example,  Greece, Turkey and Portugal and a large number  of developing  countries,  do not
satisfy the EU guidelines.  National governments  also typically  do not adhere to EU requirements
that the central  banks should  not act as a lender of last resort.  Ihe failure of collective  action in
forcing fiscal discipline at the national level arises from the "norm of universalism"  or "pork
barrel politics".  Legislators in their attempt to avoid a deadlock trade votes and support each
others projects  by implicitly  agreeing  that "I'll favor your best project if you favor mine" (Inman
and Rubinfeld, 1992: 13). Such  a behavior  leads  to overspending  and higher  debt overhang  at the
national level. It also leads to regionally differentiated  bases for federal corporate income
taxation and  thereby loss of  federal revenues through these tax  expenditures. Such tax
expenditures  accentuate  fiscal deficits at the national  level. In the first 140 years of US history,
the negative impact of  "universalism" was kept to  a  minimum by  two fiscal rules: the
Constitution formally constrained federal spending power to narrowly defined areas and an
informal rule was followed  to the effect that the federal government  could only borrow to fight
recession or wars (Niskanen, 1992). The Great Depression and the New Deal led to  an
abandonment  of these fiscal rules. Inman and Fitts (1990) provide  empirical  evidence  supporting
the working of "universalism"  in post New Deal, USA. To overcome difficulties noted above
with national  fiscal policy, solutions  proposed  include:  "gate-keeper"  committees  (Weingast  and
Marshall, 1988) imposing party discipline  within legislatures  (Cremer, 1986), constitutionally
imposed  fiscal rules (Niskanen, 1992)  and executive  agenda setting (Ingberman  and Yao, 1991)
and decentralizing when potential inefficiencies  of national government democratic choice
outweigh economic  gains with centralization.  Observing a similar situation in Latin American
11countries  prompted  Eichengreen,  Hausman  and von Hagen (1997)  to propose  establishment  of an
independent  "gate-keeper"  in the form of a national  fiscal council to periodically  set maximum
allowable increases in  general government debt.  It  is also interesting to  note that fiscal
stabilization  failed under centralized  structures  in Argentina  and Brazil but the same countries
achieved  major successes in this arena later under decentralized  fiscal systems. The results in
Table  I  provide further confirmation of  these observations. The table  shows that  debt
management  discipline  had a positive association  with the degree of fiscal decentralization  for a
sample of 80 countries.
Given that the potential exists for errant fiscal behavior of national and subnational
governments  to complicate  the conduct of monetary  policy, what institutional  arrangements  are
necessary to safeguard against such an eventuality.  As discussed below, industrial countries
place a great deal of emphasis  on intergovernmental  coordination  to achieve a synergy among
policies at different levels.  In developing  countries,  on the other hand, the emphasis  traditionally
has been on use of  centralization  or direct central controls.  These controls  typically have failed
to achieve a coordinated response due to  intergovernmental  gaming. Moreover, the national
government completely escapes any scrutiny except when it  seeks international help from
external sources such as the IMF. But external  help creates a moral hazard problem in that it
creates bureaucratic  incentives  on both sides to ensure that such assistance  is always in demand
and utilized.
Fiscal Policy  Coordination  in Mature  Federations
We have already  noted that the European  Union in its goal of creating  a monetary  union
through the provisions  of the Maastricht  treaty established  ceilings on national  deficits and debts
and supporting  provisions  that there should  be no bailout of any government  by member central
banks or by the European  Central Bank. The European  Union is also prohibited from providing
an unconditional  guarantee  in respect of the public debt of a member state (Pisani-Ferry,  1991).
Most mature federations  also specify no bailout provisions  in setting up central banks with the
notable exception of Australia until 1992 and Brazil. In the presence of an explicit or even
implicit bailout guarantee  and preferential  loans  from the banking  sector as has been the case for
Brazilian states, printing of money by subnational governments is possible thereby fueling
12inflation. European Union guidelines provide a useful framework for macro coordination  in
federal systems but such guidelines may not ensure monetary stability as the guidelines may
restrain smaller countries  with little influence  on monetary  stability such as Greece but may not
restrain superpowers like Germany (see Courchene, 1996). Thus a  proper enforcement of
guidelines-may  require a fiscal  coordinating  council.
Mature federations  vary a great deal in terms of fiscal policy coordinating  mechanisms.
In the USA, there is no overall federal-state coordination  of fiscal policy and there are no
constitutional restraints on state borrowing  but states' own constitutional  provisions prohibit
operating deficits. Intergovemmental  coordination  often comes through establishment  of fiscal
rules established through acts of Congress  such as the Gramm-Rudman  Act. Fiscal discipline
primarily  arises from three distinct incentives  offered  by the political and market cultures.  First,
the electorates  are conservative  and elect candidates  with a commitment  to keep public spending
in check. Second,  pursuit of fiscal policies  that are perceived  as imprudent  lower property  values
thereby lowering  public  revenues.  Third,  capital  markets  discipline  governments  that live beyond
their means  (see Inman  and Rubinfeld,  1992).
In Canada, there are elaborate mechanisms  for federal-provincial  fiscal coordination.
The majority  of direct program  expenditures  in Canada  are at the subnational  level but Ottawa  (
i.e. the  Canadian federal government) retains flexibility and achieves fiscal harmonization
through conditional  transfers  and tax collection  agreements. In aiddition,  Ottawa has established
a  well- knit  system of  institutional arrangements for  intergovernmental  consultation and
coordination  (see Figure 1). But much of the discipline  on public sector borrowing  comes from
the private banking sector monitoring deficits and debt at all levels of govemment. Overall
financial markets and provincial  electorates  impose a strong fiscal discipline  at the subnational
level. Fiscal policy coordination  risks in Canada can be largely attributed to the soft budget
constraint  at the federal level and therefore,  there is a need to impose  European  Union type fiscal
rules on the federal govemment.
In Switzerland,  societal conservatism,  fiscal rules and intergovernmental  relations play
an important  part in fiscal coordination.  Borrowing  by cantons and communes is restricted to
capital projects  that can be financed on a pay-as-you-go  basis and requires  popular  referenda  for
13approval. In addition, cantons and communes  must balance current budgets including interest
payments and debt amortization.  Intergovernmental  coordination  is also fostered by "common
budget directives"  applicable  to all levels of government.  These embody the following general
principles:  (a) the growth rates of public expenditures  should  not exceed  the expected  growth  of
nominal GNP; (b) the budget  deficit should not be higher  than that of the previous  year; (3) the
number  of civil servants should stay the same or increase only very slightly; (4) the volume of
public sector building should remain constant and an  inflation indexation clause should be
avoided  (Gygi, 1991:10).
The  German Constitution specifies that  Bund (federal) and  Laender (state  level
governments)  have budgetary independence  (Art. 109(1) GG) but must take into account the
requirements  of overall economic  equilibrium  (Art. 109  (2) GG). The 1969  Law of Stability and
Growth established the  Financial Planning Council and the Cyclical Planning Council as
coordinating  bodies for the two levels of government.  It stipulates  uniform  budgetary  principles
to facilitate coordination.  Annual budgets are required to be consistent  with the medium term
financial plans. The Law further empowered  the federal government  to  vary tax rates and
expenditures  on short notice and even to restrict borrowing  and equalization  transfers. Lander
parliaments no  longer have tax legislation authority and Bund and Laender borrowing is
restricted by the German constitution  to projected outlays for capital projects (the so-called
"'golden rule"). However, federal borrowing to  correct "disturbances of  general economic
equilibrium"  is exempt from the application  of this rule. The federal government  also follows a
five year budget plan to so that its fiscal policy stance is available to subnational  governments.
Two major instruments  were created by the 1969 law to forge cooperative  federalism:  (i) joint
tasks authorized  by the Bundesrat  and (ii) federal grants for state and local spending  mandated
by  federal  legislation  or  federal-state  agreements. An  additional  helpful  matter  in
intergovernmental  coordination  is that the central  bank (Bundesbank)  is independent  of all levels
of government  and focuses on price stability  as its objective.  Most important,  full and effective
federal-lander fiscal coordination is  achieved through the  Bundesrat, the  upper house of
parliament where laender governments  are directly represented.  German Bundesrat represents
the  most  outstanding institution for  formal intergovernmental coordination. Such  formal
institutions  for intergovernmental  coordination  are useful especially  in countries  with legislative
14federalism.  The Constitution  Act, 1996 of the Republic  of South Africa has established  such an
institution  for intergovernmental  coordination  called  the National  Council  of the Provinces.
Commonwealth-state  fiscal coordination  in Australia  offers important  lessons  for federal
countries.  Australia  established  a loan council  in 1927  as an instrument  of credit allocation since
it restricted  state governments  to borrow only from the commonwealth.  An important  exception
to this rule was that states could however use borrowing by autonomous  agencies and local
government for  own purposes. This  exception proved to  be  the  Achilles"  heel for  the
Commonwealth  Loan Council, as states used this exception  extensively  in their attempt to by-
pass the cumbersome  procedures  and control over their capital spending plans by the Council.
The Commonwealth  Government  ultimately recognized  in  1993 that central credit allocation
policy was a flawed and ineffective instrument. It lifted restrictions on state borrowing and
reconstituted  the Loan Council so that it could serve as a coordinating  agency for information
exchange so as to ensure greater market accountability.  The New Australian  Loan Council
attempts  to provide  a greater flexibility  to states to determine  their own borrowing  requirements
and attempts  to coordinate  borrowing  with fiscal  needs and overall macro strategy  (see Figure 2).
It further instills a greater understanding  of the budgetary process and provides timely and
valuable information  to the financial markets on public sector borrowing plans. The process
seems  to be working  well so far.
Fiscal Policy Coordination Concerns in Brazil
Tax assignments  mandated  by the Constitution  in Brazil  have reduced  federal flexibility  in
the conduct  of fiscal policies. The new Constitution  has transferred  some productive  federal  taxes
to lower level jurisdictions  and also increased  subnational  governments'  participation  in federal
revenue  sharing  schemes. Federal  flexibility  in the income  tax area, however,  has remained  intact.
This gives the federal government  some possibility  of not only affecting  aggregate  disposable
income,  and therefore  aggregate  demand,  but also exerting  direct influence  over the revenues  and
fiscal behavior of the lower levels of government  which end up receiving  nearly half of the
proceeds  of this tax.  The effectiveness  of such a policy tool is an open question  and critically
depends upon the goodwill  of subnational  governments. Consider  the case where the federal
government  decides to implement  a discretionary  income tax cut.  The measure could have a
15potentially  significant  effect  on the revenues  of state  and local governments,  given  their large  share
in the proceedings  of this tax. It is possible  that, in order  to offset this substantial  loss in revenues
from federal sources, lower levels  of government  might choose  either to increase  the rates and/or
bases on the taxes under their jurisdiction, or increase their tax effort.  Such state and local
government  responses  could potentially  undermine  the effectiveness  of income taxes as a fiscal
policy instrument.  Thus a  greater degree of intergovernmental  consultation,  cooperation  and
coordination  would  be needed  for the success  of stabilization  policies.
An overall impact  of the new fiscal arrangements  was to limit federal  control  over public
sector expenditures  in the federation.  The success of federal expenditures  as a stabilization  tool
again  depends  upon subnational  government  cooperation  in harmonizing  their expenditure  policies
with the federal  government.  Once  again,  the Constitution  has put a premium  on intergovernmental
coordination  of fiscal policies. Such a degree of coordination  may not be attainable  in times of
fiscal  distress.
A reduction  in revenues  at the federal  government's  disposal  and an incomplete  transfer  of
expenditure  responsibilities  have further  constrained  the federal  government. The primary  source
of federal revenues  are income  taxes. These  taxes are easier  to avoid  and evade by taxpayers  and
therefore are declining  in relative  importance  as a source  of revenues. Value added sales taxes,
which are considered  a more dynamic  source of revenues,  have been assigned  to the state level.
Thus federal authorities  lack access to more productive  tax bases to alleviate the public debt
problem and to gain more flexibility in the implementation  of fiscally based macroeconomic
stabilization  policies.  This situation could be  remedied if a joint federal-state VAT to  be
administered  by a federal-state  council  were to be instituted  as a replacement  for the federal  IPI,  the
state ICMS,  and the municipal  services  tax, which bases partially  overlap. Such a joint tax would
help alleviate  the current  federal  fiscal  crisis as well  as streamline  sales  tax administration.
Federal expenditure  requirements  could be curtailed  with federal disengagement  from
purely local functions  and by eliminating  federal  tax transfers  to municipalities. Transfers  to the
municipalities  would be better  administered  at the state level as states  have better access  to data on
municipal  fiscal capacities  and tax effort in their  jurisdictions. Some rethinking  is in order on the
role of negotiated  transfers  that have  traditionally  served  to advance  pork-barrel  politics  rather  than
16to address  national  objectives.  If these transfers  were replaced  by performance  oriented  conditional
block (per  capita) federal transfers to  achieve national (minimum) standards, both  the
accountability  and coordination  in the federation  would  be enhanced.  These  rearrangements  would
provide the federal government  with greater flexibility to  pursuit its macroeconomic  policy
objectives.  Finally,  some thought  needs to be given  to the  development  of fiscal  rules binding  on all
levels  of government  and a federal-state  coordinating  council  to ensure  that these  rules are enforced
(see also Bomfim and Shah, 1994 and Oliveira, 1994). There has been some progress  on these
issues  in recent  years. For examnple,  negotiated  transfers  have become  insignificant  due to the fiscal
squeeze experienced  by the federal government.  The senate has prescribed guidelines  (Senate
Resolution  #69, 1995)  for state  debt:  maximum  debt service  is not to exceed 16%  of net revenue  or
I  000/0  of current  revenue  surplus,  whichever  is less and the maximum  growth  in stock of debt (new
borrowing)  within  a 12  month  period, must not exceed  the level of existing  debt service  or 27% of
net revenues  whichever  is greater  (see Dillinger, 1997).  More recently  in 1998,  pension and civil
service entitlements reform have introduced greater budgetary flexibility for  all  levels of
government.
Deconcentration  of Fiscal  Management  in China
Before  1980,  China's  fiscal system  was characterized  by a decentralized  revenue  collection
followed  by central  transfers  i.e., all taxes and profits  were remitted  to the central  government  and
then transferred  back to the provinces  according  to expenditure  needs approved  by the center.
Under  this system,  the localities  had little managerial  autonomy  in local  economic  development.  In
1980,  this centralized  system  was  changed  into  a contracting  system. Under  the new arrangements,
each level of government  makes a contract  with the next level up to meet certain revenue  and
oependiture  targets.  A typical contract  defines a method of revenue-sharing,  which could be a
percentage  share that goes to the center, or a fixed fee plus a percentage  share. This contracting
swstem  means  that the economic  interests  of each level  of government  are sharply  identified.
Under the fiscal contract system introduced in the early 1980s, the  localities have
-ontrolled  the effective tax rates and tax bases in the following  two ways.  First, they have
ontrolled  tax collection  efforts  by offering  varying  degrees  of tax concessions. Second,  they have
foumd  ways to convert  budgetary  funds into extra-budgetary  funds,  thus avoiding  tax-sharing  with
17the center.  As a result, the center has had to resort to various ad hoc instruments  to influe=
revenue  remittance  from the localities,  and these instruments  have led to perverse  reactions  frct
the localities. On the expenditure  side,  the center  has failed to achieve  corresponding  reductions 
expenditure  when revenue collection has been decentralized. The center's flexibility in ustri
expenditure  policy has been seriously  undermined  by the lack of centrally-controlled  f^ian.iL
resources  and the heavy burden  of "capital  constructions." Between 1978  and 1992,  the ratio
government  revenue  to GNP dropped  from 31 percent  to 17  percent. Increasing  deficits  became  t
problem, and the lack of  funds for infrastructure  investment exacerbated  bottlenecks in -
economy.
Due to the lack of fiscal resources  and policy instruments,  the central government  i-
found itself  in  an  increasingly difficult position to  achieve the  goals of  macroeconom;..
stabilization,  regional equalization,  and public goods provision.  In early 1994, the cent
govermment  initiated  reform  of the tax assignment  system  in an attempt  to address  these difficultes
Under the new system,  the center  will recentralize  the administration  and collection  of central  a:
shared-taxes  and will  obtain  a larger  share  of fiscal  resources  as a result  of the new revenue-shar=i
formula. The VAT is shared 75-25 (centre-local)  and all extra central revenues  above the 1 Q-
levels  is then shared  70-30. The central  government  expected  to improve  significantly  its abilim%
use tax and expenditure  policies in macroeconomic  management as a result of these ster-
Nevertheless,  the new system  fails  to address  a number  of flaws  in the old system: (1) the divisi.cv-
of tax bases according  to ownership  will continue to motivate  the center to reclaim enterpr.se
ownership  whenever  necessary;  (2) the division  of expenditure  responsibility  is not yet clear..
defined;  (3) the new system  impedes  local autonomy  as the localities  are not allowed  to determ'L'
the bases and/or  rates for local  taxes; and (4) the design  of intergovernmental  transfers  is not ful;.
settled yet. More recently,  in 1994  and 1995,  the central  government  also imposed  administratre
restrictions on investments  by provincial  and local governments  and their enterprises  (see Mi
1995, and World Bank, 1994  for further details) to  deal with inflationary  pressures.  M1.
recently,  the introduction  of the State Council  Document  No.29 in 1996 and other measures  i:
1997 to consolidate budgetary  management  over extra-budgetary  funds, has sharply restricted
the authority of local governments  especially  rural local governments  to impose fees and levies
to finance own  expenditures (see World  Bank, 1998).
ISFiscalpolicy coordination  -some conclusions
Fiscal policy coordination  represents  an important  challenge  for federal systems.  In this
context, Maastricht guidelines  provide a useful framework  but not necessary a solution  to this
challenge. Industrialized countries experience show that  federally imposed controls and
constraints  typically do not work. Instead,  societal  norms based on fiscal conservatism  such as
the Swiss referenda and political activism of the electorate  play important roles. Ultimately
capital markets and bond-rating  agencies provide  more effective discipline  on fiscal policy. In
this context, it is important  not to backstop  state  and local debt  and not to allow ownership  of the
banks by any level of government. Transparency  of the budgetary process and institutions,
accountability  to the electorate  and general availability  of comparative data encourages  fiscal
discipline.
z.3 Subnational Borrowing
The capital finance needs of developing  and transition countries  are currently estimated
to be in.excess  of $100  billion a year by the World  Bank. Most of these investment  needs are for
local public infrastructure.  Water and sewerage  projects account  for one-half  of these investment
needs. Local governments  typically  commnand  a lion's share in public sector investments  with a
low of 30% in developing  countries  and 70% in industrialized  countries.  These investments  are
financed by taxes, charges, reserves, capital grants, borrowing and private equity and debt in
concessions/build-operate-transfer  (BOT). Borrowing has  traditionally served as  the  most
important  source of finance of such investments  in industrial  countries.  This is because resort to
borrowing enhances intergenerational  equity as these projects are long lived and yield returns
over several generations,  so that the cost should equally be shared over the same generations.
Such burden-sharing  among generations  enables local governments  to undertake  these large and
lumpy investments.  Further, this source of finance enables these governments  to tailor projects
so they are consistent with local needs without being constrained by design choices made by
higher level governments.  In developing countries, such projects are typically financed by
capital grants and on-lending  from higher level governments  as direct credit market access by
local governments is usually not available.  Since the capital finance needs of developing
19countries are quite large and catnnot  be met by traditional  sources of finance, subnational  credit
market access  represents  a major  challenge  to finance  these development  needs.
Credit market access at intermediate  levels of government (states and provinces) in
decentralized  federal countries  usually  carries few restraints.  For example  domestic and foreign
borrowing by  states/provinces  in US and Canada is not subject to  any federally imposed
constraints.  In the USA, on the contrary,  income  from state bonds is exempt from federal income
taxes. The fiscal conservatism  of these governments  in financing capital needs primarily arises
from limitations imposed  by state constitutions  and by credit market discipline.  Credit market
access is, however, closely controlled  for both state and local governments  in unitary (China,
France, Indonesia, UK and Japan) and centralized  federal countries (e.g., India, Pakistan and
Australia  until 1993)  and for local governments  only in decentralized  federal  countries (Canada,
USA, Germany).  In Germany  borrowing  by local governments  is conditional  on their cash flow
position and subject to  Laender approval.  This is because an  unrestrained access could
potentially put the national government  at risk in view of the explicit and/or implicit bailout
guarantees. Such controls  are also needed  to limit public demands  for capital investment  during
the boom periods and stimulate  such demand  during  economic  downturns.
Passive controls  on subnational  borrowing  take many forms from broader guidelines  on
allowable  ranges for the ratio of debt to revenues  and  the ratio of debt charges to own-source
revenues,  to more specific rules such as the "golden rule" for local debt commonly  adopted in
most federations. Under the golden rule, borrowing  is permitted only for capital projects and
local governments cannot finance current deficits from this source except to  smooth over
fluctuations  in revenue inflows and outflows within a given fiscal year. This is the practice in
Canada, USA, Germany and Switzerland. The European Union has imposed guidelines on
deficit  and debt limits as discussed  earlier  and has prohibited  central banks from bailing out any
governments. In Brazil, Senate  Resolution 11 (1993)  has restricted  new state borrowing  by two
formal rules: (a) total debt service cannot  exceed  the state operating  surplus  during the past year
or 15 percent of its revenues,  whichever  is less; and (b) new borrowing  within any 12 month
period cannot exceed the level of existing debt service or 27 percent of revenues,  whichever is
less.
20More active controls on such borrowing incluoie  qentrally specified limits on capital
spending  by each municipality  as in the UK; project submission  and approval  as in the province
of Ontario,  Canada; approval  for bond  finance as in Japan; aLpproval  of amount  of borrowing  and
rates as in Demnark  (usually restricted  to energy  and urban renewal  projects only) and France;
and seeking community  mandate on borrowing  plans through popular referenda  as infrequently
done in United States and Canada and routinely required in  Switzerland.  In  developing
countries,  central controls  are even more extensive  and crucle  and most of these countries  do not
allow credit market access  to local governments.  In India and Pakistan even borrowing  at state
level requires central approval as long as states and provinces owe any debt to the federal
government.  Net federal lending to states in India and provinces in Pakistan in 1996-97 was
close to zero or negative as states/provincial  debt service payments equaled or exceeded new
loans.
In  view  of the above constraints, local borrowing in most  industrial countries is
primarily from domestic markets and higher level governments. Only local governments in
Canada,  Denmark  and Norway  have foreign  debt obligations  in access  of 10%  of their total debt.
In developing countries, state and local debt obligations are primarily owed to the central
government. A  significant degree of tax decentralization  and secured sources of revenues
through formula-based  transfers is, however,  opening  up possibilities  of global market access  to
subnational  governments  especially in Latin America. Over the last few months, a handful of
local governments  ranging  from the city of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil to Argentina's provinces  of
Buenos Aires and Mendoza have sold hundreds of million dollars of notes to American and
European investors and many other governments  are eager to issue bonds on the global market
(see Table 2).  The Buenos Aires bond was oversubscribed  when it was floated in April 1997
(see Friedland, 1997).
In a decentralized  fiscal environment,  subnational  government  access to credit markets
poses significant risks for  macro stabilization policies of the national government as the
possibility of imposing  credit rationing and direct controls are significantly  constrained by the
constitutional  division of powers.  These risks are disproportionately  higher if there is a strong
dependence  of subnational  governments  on central  sources  of revenues.  In those circumstances,  a
bailout risk would be much higher  but the market  would fail to capitalize  such risks in view of its
2anticipation  of a central government  bailout.  For example,  past bailout practice and pledging of
central transfers in Argentina create expectations on the part of  commercial investors that
provinces  cannot fail.  Decentralized  fiscal systems rely upon a combination  of  credit market
discipline, moral suasion and agreed upon rules to impose financial discipline on subnational
governments.  Which system works better is an empirical question worthy of further research.
The available  evidence  nevertheless  points to a superior  perfornance of decentralized  systems in
restraining  subnational  debt. Central controls  as imposed  in France,  Spain, UK,  India, Pakistan
and Australia  (till 1992  under the old Australian  Loan Council)  failed to keep subnational  debt in
check as intergovernmental  gaming led to weaker discipline and the possibility of central
bailouts encouraged less rigorous scrutiny by the financial sector (see Box 1). Decentralized
federations, on  the  other hand,  rely on  a  combination of  guidelines, intergovernmental
cooperation and market discipline to keep local government debt within sustainable limits.
Intergovernmental  cooperation  or moral suasion is achieved  through executive  federalism  as in
Canada, or multilateral information  exchange through the New Australian Loan Council as in
Australia, or  through bilateral negotiations as  in  Denmark. The cornerstone of  financial
discipline  under a decentralized  fiscal system is the market discipline  enhanced  by an enabling
public  policy  environment that  stresses central bank  independence, disengagement of
governments from ownership of commercial  banks, no bailouts by the central bank or by a
higher level government and requirements  for public dissemination  of information  on public
finances.  Societal  conservatism  as in Switzerland  introduces  an added discipline.
Tlhe  1996 State debt crisis in Brazil should not have come as a surprise to an informed
observer.  Brazil opted for a decentralized  fiscal constitution but failed to adopt appropriate
policies and develop relevant institutions  to ensure market discipline in such environment.  It
allowed states to own commercial  banks and borrow from these in a relatively unconstrained
fashion while  holding  open the possibility  of a federal government  bailout in the event of default.
Only recently has Brazil moved  to create an enabling  framework  for credit market discipline  for
subnational borrowing (see also Ter-Minasian,  1996). Recent initiatives to control state/local
debt include:  sale or rigid controls  over state owned  banks; privatization  of utilities; downsizing;
and restructuring  and harmonization  of the state value added  tax (ICMS)  to limit its potential for
state industrial  policy (see Afonso  and Lobo, 1996).
22Facilitating  Local Access to Credit
Local access  to credit requires  well functioning  financial  markets  and credit worthy local
governments. These pre-requisites are easily met in  industrial countries. In spite of this,
traditions for assisting local governments  by higher level governments  are well established in
these countries. An interest subsidy  to state and local borrowing  is available in the USA as the
interest income of such bonds is exempt from federal taxalion.  Needless to say,  such a subsidy
has many distortionary effects: it favors richer jurisdictions and higher income individuals;  it
discriminates against non-debt sources of finance suchi as  reserves and  equity; it  favors
investments by local governments  rather than autonomous  bodies and it discourages  private
sector participation  in the form of concessions  and BOT alternatives. Various US states assist
borrowing by small local governments  through the establishment  of municipal bond banks
(MBBs).  MBBs are established  as autonomous  state agencies  that issue tax exempt securities to
investors and apply the proceeds  to purchase  collective  bond issue of several local governments.
By pooling a number of smaller issues and by using superior credit rating of the state, MBBs
reduce the cost of borrowing  to smaller communities  (see World Bank, 1996 and El Daher,
1996).
In Canada, most provinces  assist local governments  with the engineering,  financial and
economic  analysis  of projects.  Local governments  in Alberta, British  Columbia  and Nova Scotia
are assisted in their borrowing through provincial finance corporations which use the higher
credit ratings of the province to lower costs of funds foir local govermments.  Some provinces,
notably Manitoba and Quebec,  assist in the preparation  and marketing  of local debt. Canadian
provincial  governments  on occasion have also provided debt relief to their local governments.
Autonomous  agencies run on commercial  principles  to assist local borrowing exist in western
Europe and Japan. In Denmark, local governments  have collectively  established a cooperative
municipal  bank. In UK the Public Works  Loan Board channels  central  financing  to local public
works.
An important lesson arising from industrial countries' experience is that municipal
finance corporations  operate well when they are run on commercial  principles and compete  for
capital and borrowers.  In such an environment,  such agencies  allow  pooling  of risk, better utilize
23economies of scale and bring to bear their knowledge  of  local governments  and their financing
potentials to provide access to commercial credit on more favorable terms  (see McMillan,
1996).
In developing  countries,  undeveloped  markets for long term credit and weak municipal
creditworthiness limit  municipal access to  credit. Nevertheless, the  predominant central
government  policy emphasis  is on central  controls  and consequently  less attention has been paid
to assistance for borrowing.  In a few countries  such assistance  is available through specialized
institutions  and central guarantees  to jump start municipal  access  to credit. Ecuador,  Indonesia,
Jordon,  Morocco,  Philippines  and  Tunisia  have  established  municipal  development
banks/funds/facilities  for local borrowing.  These institutions  are quite fragile, not likely to be
sustainable and open to  political influences. Interest rate subsidies provided through these
institutions impede emerging capital market alternatives. Colombia and the Czech Republic
provide a  rediscount facility to  facilitate local access to  commercial credit.  Thailand has
established a guarantee fund to assist local governments  and the private sector in financing of
infrastructure  investments  (see Gouarne, 1996).
Concluding Remarks on Subnational Borrowing
In conclusion,  the menu of choices available  to local governments  for financing capital
projects are quite limited  and available  alternatives  are not conducive  to developing  a sustainable
institutional  environment  for such finance. This is because macroeconomic  instability and lack
of fiscal discipline  and appropriate  regulatory  regimes  has impeded  the development  of financial
and capital markets. In addition, revenue capacity at the local level is limited due to  tax
centralization.  A first transitory  step to provide  limited  credit market access  to local governments
may be  to  establish municipal finance corporations run on commercial principles and to
encourage the development of municipal rating agencies to  assist in  such borrowing. Tax
decentralization is also important to  establish private sector confidence in lending to  local
govermments  and sharing in the risks and rewards  of such lending.
244. Securing  An Economic  Union
Three dimnensions  of securing  an economic  union in a federal system have relevance  for
macroeconomic  governance:  preservation  of  the internal common market; tax harmonization;
transfers and social insurance; and regional fiscal equity. These are briefly discussed in the
following  paragraphs.
(i) Preservation of the Internal Common Market
Preservation of an internal common market remains an important area of concern to
most nations  undertaking  decentralization.  Subnational  governments  in their pursuit of attracting
labor  and capital may indulge  in beggar-thy-neighbor  policies and in the process  erect barriers  to
goods and factor mobility.  Thus decentralization  of government  regulatory functions creates a
potential for  disharmonious economic relations among subnational units.  Accordingly,
regulation of economic activity such as trade and investment is  generally best left to  the
federal/central  government. It should be noted, however, that central governments  themselves
may pursue policies detrimental  to the internal common market. Therefore, as suggested by
Boadway  (1992), constitutional  guarantees  for free domesticz  flow of goods and services  may be
the best alternative  to assigning  regulatory  responsibilities  solely  to the center.
The Constitutions of mature federations typically provide: a free trade clause (as in
Australia, Canada and Switzerland); federal regulatory  power over interstate commerce  (as in
Australia, Canada, Germany,  USA, and Switzerland)  and individual  mobility  rights (as in most
federations). In the USA, two constraints  imposed  by the Constitution  on state powers are (see
Rafuse, 1991: 3):
- - The commerce clause (article I, & 8): "The Congress  shall have power  .....  To regulate
commerce  with foreign  nations,  and among  the several  states,  and with the Indian  Tribes."
- - The due process clause (amendment XIV, & 1): "NXo  state shall ... deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property,  without  due process  of law."
25The Indonesian  Constitution  embodies a free trade and mobility clause. But in a large
majority of  developing countries, internal common market is impeded both by subnational
government  policies supported  by the center as well as formal  and informal  impediments  to labor
and capital mobility. For example,  in India and Pakistan, local governments  rely on a tax on
intermunicipal  trade (octroi tax) as the predominant  source of revenues.  In China,  mobility
rights of individuals  are severely  constrained by the operation  of  "hukou" system of household
registration which is used to determine  eligibility for grain rations, employment,  housing and
health care.
(ii)  Tax harmonization and coordination
Tax competition  among  jurisdictions  can be beneficial  by encouraging  cost-effectiveness
and fiscal accountability  in state governments.  It can also by itself lead to a certain  amount of tax
harmonization.  At the same time, decentralized  tax policies can cause certain inefficiencies  and
inequities  in a federation  as well as lead to excessive  administrative  costs. Tax harmonization  is
intended  to preserve  the best features  of tax decentralization  while avoiding  its disadvantages.
Inefficiencies  from decentralized  decision making can occur in a variety of ways. For
one, states may implement policies which discriminate in favor of their own residents and
businesses relative to those of other states.  They may also engage in beggar-thy-neighbor
policies intended to  attract economic activity from other states. Inefficiency may also occur
simply from  the  fact  that  distortions will  arise  from  different tax  structures chosen
independently  by state governments  with no strategic  objective in mind. Inefficiencies  also can
occur if state tax systems  adopt different  conventions  for dealing  with businesses  (and residents)
who operate in more than one jurisdiction  at the same time. This can lead to double  taxation of
some forms of  income and non-taxation of others. State tax systems may also introduce
inequities  as  mobility  of  persons  would  encourage  them  to  abandon  progressivity.
Administration costs are also likely to  be excessive in an  uncoordinated  tax system (see
Boadway, Roberts and Shah, 1994). Thus tax harmonization  and coordination contribute to
efficiency of internal common market, reduce collection and compliance costs and help to
achieve  national standards  of equity.
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used tax collection agreements,  tax abatement  and tax base sharing  to harmonize  the tax system.
The German  federation  emphasizes  uniformity  of tax bases by assigning  the tax legislation  to the
federal government. In developing countries,  due to tax centralization,  tax coordination  issues
are relevant only for larger federations such as India and Brazil. In Brazil, the use of ICMS
(origin based) as a tool for attracting capital inflow from other regions has become an area of
emerging  conflict  among  regions.  Despite  the fact that the Council  of States  sought  to harmonize
ICMS base and rates, there is evidence  that some of the tax concessions  refused by the Council
are practiced by many states anyway.  States can also resort to tax base reductions or grant
unindexed  payment deferrals  (Longo 1994).  For example,  some northeastern  states  have offered
fifteen years ICMS tax deferral to industry.  In an inflationary  environment  such a measure can
serve as an important inducement  for attracting capital from elsewhere in the country (Shah,
1991).
(iii)  Transferpayments  andSocialInsurance
Along with the provision of public goods  and services,  transfer payments  to persons  and
businesses  comprise most of government  expenditures  (especially in industrialized  countries).
Some of these transfers are for redistributive  purposes in the ordinary sense, and some are for
industrial  policy or regional  development  purposes.  Some are also for redistribution  in the social
insurance  sense, such as unemployment  insurance,  health insurance  and public pensions.  Several
factors  bear on the assignment  of responsibility  for transfers. In the case of transfers  to business,
many  economists  would argue  that they should  not be used in the first place. But, given  that they
are, they are likely to be more distortionary  if used at the provincial  level than at the federal
level. This is because the objective of subsidies  is typically  to increase capital investments  by
firms, which is mobile across provinces. As for transfers  to individuals,  since most of them are
for redistributive  purposes,  their assignment  revolves  around  the extent to which the federal level
of government assumes primary responsibility  for equity. From an economic point of view,
transfers are just negative  direct taxes. One can argue  that transfers should be controlled  by the
same level of government that controls direct taxes so that they can be integrated for equity
purposes  and harmonized  across the nation for efficiency  purposes.  The case for integration at
the central level is enhanced  when one recognizes  the several  types of transfers  that may exist to
27address  different dimensions  of equity  or social  insurance. There is an advantage  of coordinatinr
unemployment  insurance  with the income tax system or pensions with payments to the poor
Decentralizing  transfers to individuals  to the provinces  will likely lead to inefficiencies  in the
internal  common  market, fiscal inequities  and interjurisdictional  beggar-thy-neighbor  policies.
(iv)  Intergovernmental  Fiscal Transfers
Federal-state transfers in  a  federal system serve important objectives: alleviann
structural imbalances,  correcting  for fiscal inefficiencies  and inequities,  providing  compensaticc
for  benefit  spillouts  and  achieving fiscal  harmonization. The  most  important critic&
consideration  is that the grant  design must be consistent  with grant  objectives  (see Table A3 ).
In industrialized countries, two types of transfers dominate: conditional transfers tc
achieve  national  standards  and equalization  transfers  to deal with regional  equity. In developing
countries,  with a handful of exceptions,  conditional  transfers are of pork-barrel  (PB) variety anc
equalization transfers with an  explicit standard of equalization are not practiced.  Instead-
passing-the-buck  (PB) transfers in the form of tax-by-tax sharing and revenue sharing with
multiple factors are used. With limited or  no tax  decentralization,  PB type transfers ir
developing world finance majority of subnational expenditures. In the process, they builc
transfer dependencies  and discourage development  of responsive and accountable  governance
(see Shah, 1997). Ehdaie (1994) provides empirical support for this proposition.  He concludes
that simultaneous  decentralization  of the national  government's  taxing and spending powers.  bx
directly linking the costs and benefits of public provision,  tends to reduce the size of the public
sector.  Expenditure  decentralization  accompanied  by revenue sharing delinks responsibility  and
accountability  and thereby  fails to achieve  this result.
In general, PB type transfers  create incentives  for subnational  governments  to undertake
decisions  that are contrary  to their long run economic  interests in the absence  of such transfers.
Thus they impede natural adjustment responses leading to  a  vicious cycle of  perpetual
deprivation  for less developed regions (see also Courchene, 1996  and Shah, 1996 for a further
discussion).
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in the absence  of a well designed  fiscal transfers program.  The design of these transfers must be
simple, transparent and consistent with their objectives (see Table A3) . Properly structured
transfers can enhance competition  for the supply of public services,  accountability  of the fiscal
system and fiscal coordination  just as general revenue  sharing has the potential  to undermine  it.
Experiences  of Indonesia and Pakistan offer important insights in grant design. For example,
Indonesia's  education  and health grants use simple and objectively  quantifiable indicators in
allocation of funds and conditions for the continued eligibility of these grants emphasize
objective standards  as to access to these services.  Indonesian  grants for public sector wages on
the other hand, represents  an example  of not so thoughtful  design as it introduces  incentives  for
higher public employment at  subnational levels. Pakistan's  matching grant for  resource
mobilization,  similarly rewards  relatively richer provinces  for additional  tax effort. It also calls
into question  the credibility  of federal commitment  as the federal government  has not been able
to meet its commitment  arising  from this grant  program.
The role of fiscal transfers in enhancing competition for the supply of public goods
should also not be overlooked. For example,  transfers for basic health and primary education
could be made available to both public and not-for-profit  private sector on equal basis using as
criteria, the  demographics of  the  population served, school age population and  student
enrollments  etc. This would promote competition and innovation as both public and private
institutions  would compete  for public funding. Chile permits Catholic  schools access to public
education  financing.  Canadian  provinces  allows individual  residents  to choose among  public and
private  schools  for the receipt  of their property  tax dollars.  Such an option has introduced  strong
incentives  for public and private  schools  to improve  their performances  and be competitive.  Such
financing  options are especially  attractive  for providing  greater  access to public services in rural
areas.
(v) Regional  Fiscal Equity
While we have not addressed  the regional equity issue due to paucity of data, a few
casual observations  may be in order. As we noted earlier,  regional inequity  is an area of concern
for decentralized fiscal systems and most such systems attempt to deal with it through the
29spending powers of the national government  or through fraternal  programs. Mature federations
such as Australia, Canada and Germany have formal equalization  programs. This important
feature of decentralization  has not received adequate  attention in the design of institutions in
developing countries. Despite serious horizontal fiscal imbalances in  a  large number of
developing  countries, explicit  equalization programs  are  untried,  although  equalization
objectives are implicitly  attempted in the general revenue sharing mechanisms  used in Brazil.
Colombia, India, Mexico,  Nigeria and Pakistan. These mechanisms  typically combine diverse
and conflicting objectives into the same formula and fall significantly short on  individual
objectives. Because these formulas lack explicit equalization standards, they fail to address
regional  equity objectives  satisfactorily.
Regional inequity concerns are more easily addressed by unitary countries but it is
interesting  to note that the record of unitary countries  in addressing  these inequities is uneven
and certainly no better than federal countries (For evidence on regional income inequalities.,
Canada: Shah (1996), China, Tsui (1996), Indonesia  (Shah and Qureshi, 1994), Brazil (Shah.
1991),  Pakistan  (Shah, 1996),  India  (Rao and Sen, 1995)).
5. Special  Challenges  Arising  from Globalization
Globalization  of economic  activity poses special challenges  to fiscal federalism. With
globalization,  it is increasingly  becoming  apparent  that nation states are  too small to tackle large
things in life and too large to address small things. More simply nation states are fast loosing
control of some of their areas of traditional  control and regulation  such as regulation  of external
trade, telecommunications,  financial  transactions  and corporate  taxation. National governments
are experiencing diminished control in their ability to control the flow of goods and services.
ideas and cultural products. These difficulties  are paving  way for the emergence  of specialized
institutions  of global governance  such as the World  Trade Organization,  Global Environmental
Facility with  many more to follow especially  institutions  to regulate information  technology.
satellite communications,  and international  financial transactions.  Thus nation states would be
confederalizing in  the  coming years  and  relinquishing responsibilities in  these areas to
supranational  institutions.
30In the emerging  borderless  world economy,  interests  of residents  as citizens are often at
odds with their interests as consumers. In securing  their initerests  as consumers in the world
economy,  individuals  are increasingly  seeking  localization  and regionalization  of public decision
making to better safeguard  their interests. With greater mobility of capital, and loosening of
regulatory environment for  foreign direct investment, local governments as  providers of
infrastructure  related services  would serve as more appropriate  channels for attracting such
investment  than national  governments. As borders become more porous, cities are expected  to
replace countries in transnational economic alliances as people across Europe are already
discovering that  national governments  has diminishing relevance in their lives. They are
increasingly  more inclined  to link their identities  and allegiances  to cities and regions.
With mobility of capital and other inputs, skills ralher than resource  endowments will
determine  international  competitiveness.  Education  and training  typically however  is subnational
government  responsibility. Therefore,  there would a need to realign  this responsibility  by giving
the national government  a greater role in skills enhancement. The new economic  environment
will also polarize the distribution of income in favor of skilled workers accentuating  income
inequalities and  possibly wiping  out  lower  middle  income classes.  Since the  national
governments  may not have the means to  deal with this  social policy fallout,  subnational
governments  working in tandem with national governments  would have to devise strategies in
dealing  with the emerging crisis in social policy.
International trade agreements  typically embody social policy provisions. But social
policy is typically an area of subnational  government  responsibility  as in  Canada,  Brazil, India,
Pakistan and USA. This is an emerging area for conflict  among different levels of government.
To avoid these conflicts , a guiding principle should be that to the extent these agreements
embody social  policy provisions  they must be subject  to ratification  by subnational  governments
as is currently  the practice in Canada.
An overall implication  of the above  discussion  for macroeconomic  governance  in federal
countries is that both globalization  and localization  imply a diminished direct role of federal
government in stabilization  and macroeconomic  control. But given that there is likely to be an
31enhanced  role for regimes and subnational  governments  in the same areas, federal government's
role in coordination  and oversight  will increase.
5. Some Lessons  For Developing  Countries
The following  important  lessons  for reform  of fiscal systems in developing  countries  can
be distilled  from a review of past experiences.
*  Monetary policy  is best entrusted to an independent central bank with a mandate for  price
stability. Political feasibility of  such an  assignment improves under federal  systems
(decentralized  fiscal system).
*  Fiscal rules accompanied by  "gate keeper"  intergovernmental councils/committees provide
a usefulframework  for fiscal  discipline andfiscal  policy  coordination. In this  context, one
can  draw upon  industrial countries' experiences with  'golden rules',  Maastricht type
guidelines and 'common budget directives' to develop country specific guidelines.  To
ensure voluntary compliance  with the guidelines,  appropriate  institutional  framework must
be developed. Transparency  of the budgetary  processes and institutions, accountability  to
electorate and general availability  of comparative  data on fiscal positions of all levels of
government  further  strengthens  fiscal discipline.
*  The integrity and independence of the financial  sector contributes to fiscal  prudence  in the
public sector. To ensure such an integrity and independence,  ownership and preferential
access to the financial sector  should not be available  to any level of government.  In such an
environment capital markets and bond rating agencies would provide an effective fiscal
policy  discipline.
*  To  ensure fiscal  discipline,  governments  at  all  levels  must  be  made  to face  financial
consequences  of their decisions.  This is possible  if the central govermnent  does not backstop
state and local debt and the central  bank does not act as a lender of last resort to the central
governrment.
*  Societal norms and consensus on roles of various levels of governments  and limits to their
authorities are vitalfor  the success of decentralized decision making.  In the absence of such
norms and consensus, direct central controls do not work and intergovernmental  gaming
leads  to dysfunctional  constitutions.
32*  Tax decentralization  is a pre-requisite for  subnational  credit  market access. In countries
with  highly  centralized tax  bases, unrestrained credit  market  access by  subnational
governments  poses a risk for macro stabilization  policies of  the national  government  as the
private sector anticipates  a higher level govermment  bailout in the event of default and does
not discount  the risks of such lending  properly.
*  Higher level institutional assistance may be neededfor financing  local capital projects.  This
assistance can  take the  form  of  establishing municipal finance  corporations run  on
commercial  principles  to lower the cost of borrowing  by using the superior credit rating of
the higher  level government  and municipal  rating agencies  to determine  credit worthiness.
*  An  internal  common  market  is  best  preserved  by  constitutional  guarantees.  National
governments  in developing  countries  have  typically  failed in this role.
*  Intergovernmental  transfers  in  developing  countries  undermine  fiscal  discipline  and
accountability  while  building  transfer  dependencies  that  cause  a  slow  economic
strangulation  of fiscally  disadvantaged  regions.  Properly  designed  intergovernmental
transfers on the other hand can enhance competition  for the supply of public goods, fiscal
harmonization, subnational government accountability and regional equity. Substantial
theoretical  and empirical  guidance  on the design of these transfers  is readily available.
*  Periodic  review  of jurisdictional  assignments  is essential  to realign  responsibilities  with
changing  economic  and political  realities.  With  globalization  and  localization,  national
government's direct role in stabilization  and macroeconomic  control is likely to diminish
over time but its role in coordination  and oversight  is expected  to increase as regimes and
subnational governments assume enhanced roles in these areas. Constitutional  and legal
systems and institutions must be amenable to  timely adjustments to  adapt to  changing
circumstances.
*  Finally, contrary to a common misconception, decentraliredfiscal  systems offer a greater
potentialfor  improved macroeconomic governance than centralizedfiscal  systems. This is to
be expected  as decentralized  fiscal systems  require  greater clarity  in the roles of various
players (centers  of decision  making)  and transparency  in rules that govern their interactions
to ensure a fair play.
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38Box 1: Approaches  to Sub-national  Capital  Finance
Pakistan:  Pakistan's  Annual Development  Plan (ADP)  process  typifies  a highly  centralized  system.  The ADP process
begins with a municipality's  submission  of a project  proposal  to the provincial  government,  where it is subjected  to
technical review; if technically  approved, it is then included in a  larger pool of projects eligible for financing.
Financing decisions are made annually,  and begin with an estimate of overall resource availability  by the central
governmenfs  ministry  of finance.  The provincial  government  then makes  a tentative  match  of resources  with projects;
then forwards  it recommendations  to the central Government's  annual  plan coordination  committee;  which approves
size  and sectoral  allocation  of the overall  package,  and then submits  it to the national  economic  council,  presided  over
by the president.  This lengthy  process  does succeed  in eliminating  technically  unsound  projects,  and matches  resources
to projects,  but incorporates  no mechanism  for weighing  the degree  of local commitment  to investments  projects.
Mexico: Mexico's National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL)  is funded frorm  an earmarked  share of the national
budget. Allocations  are distributed  among states by formula, with a fixed proportion earmarked  for allocation by
mayors. Allocations  to municipalities  are based in part upon political  considerations.  But within a given recipient
municipio,  the allocation  of funds among projects  draws upon a well developed  system  of negotiation  between  the
mayor  and community  groups,  in which PRONASOL  funding  is made  conditional  upon the community's  willingness
to provide counterpart  contributions  in cash or in kind. While mayors have the latitude  to vary the terms of each
project  agreement,  the matching  requirement  is universal.
Colombia:  Colombia's  municipal  credit institution,  Financiera  de Desarrollo  T  erritorial  (FINDETER),  does not lend
directly  to municipal  governments  but operates  as an autonomous  discount  agency to private  sector and state-owned
commercial  banks that make the loans, appraise the projects, and monitor performance.  Under the control of the
finance ministry, it has been relatively insulated  from political  pressures.  The system's funding does not rely on
government  budgetary  appropriation  but rather on bonds, recycling  of it loans, and foreign  credits  from bilateral  and
multi-lateral  sources.
Canada: Provincial governments  have free and uncontrolled  access to borrowing  on domestic and international
markets.  Municipal  borrowing  is subject  to provincial  scrutiny  and approval.  Once approval  is granted,  municipalities
are free  to borrow  from the private  sector.  Although  no additional  role is required,  provincial  authorities  can provide  a
variety of  additional assistance including loan guarantees,  transfers to  cover loans, assistance in marketing of
municipal  debt, and loans. Some  provinces  borrow  for the purpose  of relending  to small  local governments
United States: Both state and local governments  have unrestricted access to capital markets. Municipalities,  or
municipal  agencies,  issue bonds. Creditworthiness  of municipal  offerings  is determined  by private  rating companies.
Federal  and state  governments  promote  bond issues  through  income  tax exemptions  on interest  payments.
Australia:  The Australia  Loan Council  (ALC), established  in 1927 as a central  credit allocation  mechanism  for sub-
national  borrowing  was seen  as an outmoded  institution  for the 21st century. The ALC now works as a coordinating
agency  for sharing information  on federal-state-local  fiscal  positions  and macroeconomic  strategies.  States  are required
to justify their borrowing  plans for consistency  with own fiscal  needs and overall  macro strategy  for the nation as a
whole.  If these  requirements  are met, state are  free  to access  financial  markets  for raising  the required  funds.
European  Union: Maastricht  Treaty imposes  two quantitative  guidelines  to ensure price stability oriented  monetary
policy.  These are: (a) the deficit  must be less  than 3% of GDP and (b) the debt/GDP  ratio must not exceed  0.6 (60%).
Further  in the event  of default,  there  should  not be any bailout  by member  central  banks or the European  Central  Bank.
Sources:  World  Bank (1994,  July),  and Shah  (forthcoming)
39Table 1: Correlation  of the Decentralization  Index  with Governance  Quality  Indicators
(sample  size: 80 countries)
Pearson  Correlation  Coefficients
Citizen  Participation
Political Freedom  0.599**
Political  Stability  0.604**
Government  Orientation
Judicial Efficiency  0.544**
Bureaucratic  Efficiency  0.540**
Absence  of Corruption  0.532**
Social  Development
Human Development  Index  0.369*
Egalitarianism  in Income  0.373*
Distribution
(inverse  of Gini coefficient)
Economic  Management
Central  Bank Independence  0.327*
Debt Management  Discipline  0.263  *
Openess  of the Economy  0.523**
Governance  Quality  Index  0.617**
* significant  at the 0.05% level (2-tailed  test)
** significant  at the 0.01%  level (2-tailed  test)
Source:  Huther and Shah (1998)
40Table  2. Recent  Latin 'Munis'
Issuer (country)  Value  (US $million)
Done Deals:
City of Rio de Janeiro  (Brazil)  $125
Buenos Aires  Province  (Argentina)  $145
$170
Mendoza  Province  (Argentina)  $150
In the Pipeline
Neuquen  Province  (Argentina)  $300
Rio Negro Province  (Argentina)  $230
Tierra del Fuego Province  (Argentina)  $75
State of Alagos (Brazil)  $160
State of Minas Gerais (Brazil)  $250
City of Bogota  (Colombia)  $150
City of Lima (Peru)  $150
Source:  Friedland  (1997).
41Box. Principles  and Better  Practices  in Grant  Design
Grant Objective  Grant Design  Better Practices  Practices to avoid
To bridge  fiscal  gap  *  Reassign  responsibilities  Tax abatement  in Canada  and  Deficit grants
*  Tax abatement  tax base sharing in Canada,  Tax by tax sharing  as in India
*  Tax base sharing  Brazil and Pakistan
To reduce regional  fiscal  General  Non-matching  Fiscal  Fiscal  equalization  programs  General  revenue  sharing with
disparities  capacity  equalization  transfers  of Australia,  Canada  and  multiple  factors as in Brazil
Germany
To compensate  for benefit  Open-ended  matching  RSA grant for teaching
spillovers  transfers  with matching  rate  hospitals
consistent  with spillout  of
benefits
Setting  national  minimum  Conditional  non-matching  Indonesia  roads  and primary  conditional  transfers  with
standards  block  transfers  with  education  grants  conditions  on spending  alone
conditions  on standards  of  Colombia  and Chile education  ad hoc grants
service  and access  transfers
Influencing  local priorities  in  Open-ended  matching  Matching  transfers  for social  ad hoc grants
areas of high national  but low  transfers  (with preferably  assistance  as in Canada
local priority  matching  rate to vary
inversely  with fiscal capacity)
Stabilization  capital grants  provided  Limit use of capital  grants and  stabilization  grants with no
maintenance  possible  encourage  private  sector  future  upkeep  requirements
participation  by providing
political  and policy risk
guarantee
Source:  Shah  (1994),  Boadway,  Roberts and Shah  (1994)
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